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Chapter 5
Scientific Perspectives, Feminist 
Standpoints, and Non-Silly Relativism
Natalie Alana Ashton
Abstract Defences of perspectival realism are motivated, in part, by an attempt to 
find a middle ground between the realist intuition that science seems to tell us a true 
story about the world, and the Kuhnian intuition that scientific knowledge is histori-
cally and culturally situated. The first intuition pulls us towards a traditional, abso-
lutist scientific picture, and the second towards a relativist one. Thus, perspectival 
realism can be seen as an attempt to secure situated knowledge without entailing 
epistemic relativism. A very similar motivation is behind feminist standpoint theory, 
a view which aims to capture the idea that knowledge is socially situated whilst 
retaining some kind of absolutism. Elsewhere I argue that the feminist project fails 
to achieve this balance; its commitment to situated knowledge unavoidably entails 
epistemic relativism (though of an unproblematic kind), which allows them to 
achieve all of their feminist goals. In this paper I will explore whether the same 
arguments apply to perspectival realism. And so I will be asking whether perspec-
tival realism too is committed to an unproblematic kind of relativism, capable of 
achieving scientific goals; or, whether it succeeds in carving out a third view, 
between or beyond the relativism/absolutism dichotomy.
Keywords Feminist standpoint theory · Feminist epistemology · Perspectival 
realism · Relativism
5.1  Introduction
Ronald Giere (2006) presented his perspectival realism as a way to mediate between 
absolute, realist scientific objectivism on the one hand, and a variety of relativist, 
anti-realist, social constructivist views, on the other hand. On Giere’s view, knowl-
edge is situated, but we can still make meaningful reference to a single ‘real’ world, 
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independent of any perspective. This sounds very similar, both in content and moti-
vation, to feminist standpoint theory. Standpoint theory is also a view on which 
knowledge is situated (socially situated, due to factors like a knower’s race and 
gender), and which (at least on some framings) has been presented as a third way 
between absolute scientific objectivism and relativism about scientific claims.
Elsewhere I have argued that feminist standpoint theory fails at its goal of pro-
viding a genuinely distinct ‘third way’. On closer inspection, it turns out that (a 
certain kind of) relativism is essential to the view (Ashton forthcoming); although, 
unlike most anti-relativist critics of standpoint theory, I don’t believe that this dimin-
ishes its usefulness in any way. In this paper I apply these arguments I’ve made 
about feminist standpoint theory to perspectival realism, to show that perspectival 
realism (or at least some versions of it) are akin to relativism too.
In Sect. 5.1, I introduce perspectival realism and feminist standpoint theory, and 
discuss the similarities between them in more detail. In Sect. 5.2, I recount my argu-
ment that feminist standpoint theory is a form of relativism. In Sect. 5.3, I apply this 
argument to perspectival realism, to show that it too is a form of relativism. Giere 
has expressed concerns about his view being mistaken for, or conflated with, what 
he calls “silly relativism” (2006, 13)—the view that all perspectives are as good as 
one another, and thus ‘anything goes’. So, in Sect. 5.4, I spend some time specifying 
what kind of relativism is present in the version of perspectival realism that Giere 
puts forward. I make clear that it is an unproblematic, epistemic relativism, which is 
not “silly” in the way that Giere warns against.1 I conclude by considering what 
perspectival realism and feminist standpoint theories can learn from one another.
Before I start, I am going to run through some preliminary definitions which will 
be useful to keep in mind for the rest of the paper. Some might seem like very basic 
terms that most readers will have a handle on already, but these are precisely the 
terms where nuances can be lost and confusion created if special care is not taken.
First, realism and anti-realism. These are terms for metaphysical views about 
‘what there is’. Realists believe that there is an uncomplicatedly mind-independent 
world, which exists regardless of whether and what we discover about it. Anti- 
realists believe something other than this: namely, that there is no mind-independent 
world, or that the world depends in some (important) way on (or is affected by) us 
and our investigations. One form of anti-realism that Giere talks about is social 
constructivism. Social constructivists believe that (at least some) objects of inquiry 
are determined (or ‘created’) by social processes, namely our investigations and our 
interpretations of the results of these investigations.
The other key terms that I will be using are epistemic terms; these terms apply to 
claims about what we believe, know, and understand. Objectivity is the property (of 
1 Some people equate relativism with the silliness Giere has in mind, and to them the idea of non-
silly relativism seems like a misnomer – views which aren’t silly cannot also be relativism, so if a 
view is shown not to be silly, it must be something other than relativism (c.f. David Bloor’s discus-
sion of “foolishness conditions” (Bloor 2011, 452)). As a precursor to my argument for non-silly 
(and non-derogatory) relativism, it might be helpful to point out that there are a number of serious, 
self-described epistemic (or scientific) relativists, including: David Bloor (1976), Lorraine Code 
(1991), Paul Feyerabend (2010), Martin Kusch (2002), and Richard Rorty (1991).
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justification or of knowledge claims) of being independent of social or individual 
factors. It is often associated with absolutism, which is the view that the standards 
for justification apply universally, regardless of time, place, culture, and so on.2 
These are both typically taken to be in opposition to epistemic relativism, which is 
the view that there are, or can be, different justificatory standards which apply in 
different times, places, cultures, and so on.
When I talk about relativism I mean epistemic relativism, and specifically a view 
which incorporates three components identified by Martin Kusch (2016, 34–5).3 
The first component is epistemic dependence, which says that a belief or claim has 
an epistemic status (as justified or unjustified) only relative to an epistemic system 
or practice. This can be seen as a rejection of absolutism, as defined above. Michael 
Williams (2007, 94) also identifies this component, though his definition only makes 
explicit reference to systems, not practices. The second component is plurality: 
there are (or have been, or could be) more than one such epistemic system or prac-
tice. Plurality is widely accepted as a necessary component of relativism (e.g. 
Williams 2007, 94; Coliva 2015, 140). The third component, non-neutral symmetry, 
says that there is no neutral (i.e., system-independent) way to evaluate or rank sys-
tems or practices (Kusch 2016, 35). It will be worth discussing this component in 
more detail.
Non-neutral symmetry lines up nicely with the rejection of absolutism that we’ve 
seen embodied by dependence. Recall that absolutism is the idea that justification is 
independent of time, place, culture, and so on. Epistemic dependence rejects this 
claim, on the ground that justification is dependent on (temporally, geographically, 
or culturally) contingent systems and practices. Non-neutrality expresses a related 
point: if justification is system-dependent, then the justification for any evaluation 
or ranking of a set of systems will be epistemically dependent too. Neutral, or 
system- independent, rankings are not possible.
As we’ll see, discussions of relativism often involve a different version of sym-
metry, known as equality, or equal validity, which says that all epistemic systems and 
practices are equally correct (Kusch 2016, 35). At first sight this might appear to be 
almost indistinguishable from non-neutrality—after all, they both seem to say that it 
is not possible to rank different systems and practices. But on further investigation 
they are quite different. Neither of them rules out system-rankings altogether, and, 
unlike non-neutrality, equal validity is incompatible with the rejection of absolutism. 
Remember, non-neutrality doesn’t say that no rankings at all are possible—only that 
system-independent rankings are not. This, as we saw above, is in line with the rejec-
tion of absolutism as embodied by dependence. Equal validity doesn’t say that no 
2 Not to be confused with absolutism in philosophy of science, which is not typically tied (at least 
directly) to justification. Thanks to Michela Massimi for flagging up this potential source of 
confusion.
3 Kusch identifies five essential components of relativism (and several further non-essential ones) 
in total (2016, 34–6). I’ve decided to just include three of Kusch’s essential components, because 
there is precedent for this tripartite understanding of epistemic relativism (e.g. Williams 2007; 
Coliva 2015), and because I believe the other two essential components can be shown to follow 
from these three.
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rankings are possible either, because it itself is a ranking: it says that all systems and 
practices rank in the same position, and it seems to presume a neutral point (or non-
point) of view from which this ranking is made. This directly conflicts with depen-
dence and the rejection of absolutism, but fits naturally within an absolutist picture.
If a view contains the first three components I’ve mentioned—dependence, plu-
rality, and non-neutral symmetry—then it is, or includes, a form of epistemic rela-
tivism. If, instead, (or in addition) it contains equal validity then it is internally 
inconsistent, and not a form of epistemic relativism. With these preliminaries in 
place, it’s time to properly introduce and compare perspectival realism and feminist 
standpoint theory.
5.2  Comparing Perspectival Realism and Feminist 
Standpoint Theory
In this sect. I will outline both perspectival realism and feminist standpoint theory, 
and then highlight some central similarities between the two views. In doing this I 
will make clear why I think that the arguments I am about to make about standpoint 
theory could also be applied to perspectival realism. I will also point to some impor-
tant differences which should be borne in mind when attempting to draw out con-
nections between perspectival realism and feminist standpoint theory.
Perspectival realism is a view proposed as a middle way between objective scien-
tific realism and a variety of anti-realist views, encompassing relativism and con-
structivism (Giere 2006, 3; Massimi 2018, 164). It is realist to the extent that it 
allows that there can be a single way the world metaphysically is, but is perspectival 
in the sense that it says that our knowledge of the world— including our best scien-
tific knowledge—is historically and culturally situated, and cannot give a single, 
complete, objective picture of the world.4 Giere’s comparison between his descrip-
tion of representational scientific models, on the one hand, and maps on the other 
hand, helps to make this idea clearer (2006, 72–81). Like maps, Giere says that 
scientific models are partial, limited representations of a particular area or aspect of 
the world (2006, 72–3). In the same way that multiple, different, and even conflict-
ing, maps can be said to accurately represent the world, multiple incompatible mod-
els, can accurately represent the world too (2006, 78–80). This means that we must 
create, and choose between, models (as we do with maps) based on our interests, 
and interpret them using existing cultural conventions (2006, 73–4).
Feminist standpoint theories, which comprise one of the main branches of femi-
nist epistemology, are best explained by making reference to three theses.5 The situ-
4 Michela Massimi points out that different authors take different views on whether historical or 
cultural situatedness takes priority, or whether they are both equally important to perspectival real-
ism (2018, 164).
5 The other main branches of feminist epistemology are feminist empiricism (e.g., Anderson 1995, 
Longino 1997) and feminist postmodernism (e.g., Haraway 1988).
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ated knowledge thesis, which is common to all branches of feminist epistemology, 
says that differences in the social situations of inquirers (including things like their 
race and gender) make for epistemic differences—differences in what they can jus-
tifiably believe (Ashton and McKenna forthcoming). Feminist standpoint theory 
offers two further theses which help to specify the situated knowledge thesis. The 
standpoint thesis says that justification depends on ‘socially situated’ perspectives. 
According to this idea, subjects have different ‘social locations’, or different sta-
tuses as socially oppressed or socially privileged. For example, black women occupy 
very different social locations to white men, and these different social locations 
come with different experiences, which have the potential to enable different epis-
temic perspectives. Finally, the epistemic advantage thesis says that experiencing 
social oppression can lead to more, or better, justification. The idea is that subjects 
who are socially oppressed have distinct experiences, and through critically reflect-
ing on these can turn their perspective into a ‘standpoint’—an epistemically privi-
leged perspective from which the nature of relevant social relations is visible. 
Subjects who are not oppressed do not have these experiences, and as a result are 
less likely to achieve a standpoint.6 Different versions of standpoint theory can be 
distinguished by how they flesh out the details of the epistemic advantage thesis, but 
all of them take this, and the standpoint thesis, as a starting point. Then it is clear 
that on standpoint theory, as with perspectival realism, knowledge is situated.
Standpoint theory can also be seen as a middle way, between traditional scientific 
objectivity and what Giere has called “silly relativism” (Giere 2006, 13). Sandra 
Harding (1991) has explicitly presented it in this way.7 She rejects the traditional 
approach to objectivity in science, which she describes an as attempt to eradicate all 
values from science. She says that this is too ambitious, because some values have 
benefited science (Harding 1991, 144),8 but also that these ambitions aren’t success-
fully lived up to. When you try to ignore the effect of social factors on science, you 
end up allowing unconscious, deeply embedded values—including racist and sexist 
ones—to thrive unmonitored (1991, 143). However, instead of embracing relativism 
as the alternative to this “weak objectivism”, she instead proposes that we conduct 
science according to the goal of “strong objectivity” (1991, 149–52). This means 
acknowledging that values have a role in science—i.e., that knowledge is situated—
and then paying close attention to them, so that we can be aware of and mitigate 
their effects.
6 Four important caveats accompany the epistemic advantage thesis. The advantage: doesn’t depend 
on essential categories (e.g., of ‘woman’); it isn’t a necessary or a sufficient condition on member-
ship of a social group; it isn’t ‘automatic’, but earned through critical reflection; and it can be 
restricted in scope (Ashton and McKenna forthcoming).
7 Most standpoint theorists have disavowed relativism (e.g., Medina 2013), and their views are 
often interpreted as rejections of objectivity due to their commitment to situatedness. Harding is 
the only author I know of who has explicitly presented her view as a middle way.
8 C.f. Longino (1997) who argues that some values are necessary when choosing between multiple 
models or theories that fit the evidence equally well.
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To sum up, standpoint theory and perspectival realism have at least two things in 
common. They both see knowledge as situated, by which I mean they both think 
that knowledge depends on necessarily partial and interested perspectives. And they 
have each been framed as a middle way between traditional scientific objectivism on 
the one hand, and ‘silly’, relativism and constructivism on the other. Before moving 
on, there are however two differences between perspectival realism and standpoint 
theory that I should flag up. The first is due to Kristina Rolin (2009), who argues that 
standpoint theories have a distinctive focus on power relations, which Giere’s view 
of scientific models as akin to maps does not capture:
The map metaphor invites us to see the subject matter of inquiry as a passive object waiting 
to be represented by someone else. In the map metaphor, scientific knowledge is perspec-
tival in the sense that the mapmakers decide what to represent and to what degree of detail 
to represent it. In my interpretation of feminist standpoint theory, social-scientific research 
is perspectival not only in this sense but also in another sense. The term “perspective” refers 
not only to a social scientist’s perspective but also to an informant’s perspective, and these 
two perspectives may or may not meet each other in the inquiry (Rolin 2009, 223).
Whilst Giere emphasises the partiality and contingency of scientific theories, Rolin 
says that standpoint theories go further by showing that the power relations sur-
rounding the construction and testing of scientific theories can suppress or distort 
evidence. It’s not just that there are multiple ways that scientists can choose to go 
about ‘mapping’, but that what they are trying to map can present itself in multiple 
ways—the terrain can move. The second difference between feminist standpoint 
theory and perspectival realism is that they come from different sub-disciplines with 
different sets of terminology. Perspectival realism comes from the philosophy of 
science, and authors here use the language of “theories”, “models” and their “fit 
with the evidence”, whilst feminist standpoint theory comes from epistemology and 
often makes claims about “belief” and “justification”. These terminologies don’t 
translate perfectly, and whilst I don’t think this will raise particular problems in this 
paper, I do think it’s important to flag it to avoid confusion.
5.3  Relativism in Feminist Standpoint Theory
In the previous sect. I showed that there are two key similarities between feminist 
standpoint theory and perspectival realism. The first is that they both involved situ-
atedness, and so reject traditional objectivity. The second is that, despite the above, 
their proponents have been keen to distance themselves from epistemic relativism. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the anti-relativist arguments that standpoint theorists 
make don’t work, and that feminist standpoint theory is best understood as an illus-
tration of how epistemic relativism can be successful (Ashton, forthcoming). In this 
paper I’m going to argue that the same is true of perspectival realism, but first I’ll 
briefly explain my argument that standpoint theory is relativist.
Recall that there are three components which I take to be jointly sufficient for 
epistemic relativism: epistemic dependence, plurality, and non-neutral symmetry. 
N. A. Ashton
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The first two of these follow quite naturally from the standpoint thesis. Dependence 
follows because the standpoint thesis says that justification is dependent on a per-
spective. Plurality follows from it because the standpoint thesis says that there is 
more than one of these perspectives. So standpoint theory uncontroversially has two 
of the three components that are jointly sufficient for relativism. Accordingly, stand-
point theorists hoping to disprove the claim that their views are relativist standardly 
attempt to do so by denying that they endorse the third component of epistemic rela-
tivism, symmetry. They do this by pointing to the epistemic advantage thesis, which 
says that the standpoints of socially oppressed groups provide epistemic benefits 
(Tanesini 2018). The idea is that the epistemic advantage thesis shows that some 
standpoints (those of the socially oppressed) are better than others, that standpoint 
theory allows standpoints to be ranked, and that standpoint theory is therefore not 
compatible with symmetry. If it isn’t compatible with symmetry then it can’t include 
all three of the components which are jointly sufficient for relativism, and so the 
argument that it is relativist falls apart.
But remember in the Introduction I distinguished between two versions of sym-
metry: non-neutral symmetry and symmetry based on equal validity. My (forthcom-
ing) argument that feminist standpoint theory is relativist turns on this point. Or, 
rather, on standpoint theorist’s failure to recognise this point. Standpoint theorists 
succeed in showing that the epistemic advantage thesis is incompatible with sym-
metry based on equal validity. Equal validity says that there is no way at all to rank 
epistemic systems and that they are all equally correct. The epistemic advantage 
thesis says that some standpoints are better than others, and so is incompatible with 
this. But this is all beside the point if, as I have claimed, non-neutrality, rather than 
equal validity, is what makes a view relativist.9 Non-neutrality makes a weaker 
claim than equal validity; it doesn’t say that there is no way at all to rank different 
epistemic systems, it only says that there is no neutral, system-independent way to 
evaluate or rank different epistemic systems. The epistemic advantage thesis isn’t 
incompatible with this version of symmetry, and so its presence isn’t sufficient to 
show that standpoint theory is not a form of epistemic relativism.
The epistemic advantage thesis could be made to be incompatible with non- 
neutrality (and so with epistemic relativism) if it were interpreted such that the 
ranking(s) it recommends are system-independent. If the claim that (for example) 
black feminist standpoints are epistemically superior to the perspectives of white 
men was supposed to be absolutely justified, rather than justified relative to one or 
more specified epistemic systems, then it would be incompatible with non- neutrality 
9 On this definition of relativism, many more accounts of justification and scientific knowledge will 
turn out to be relativist than we (or even the proponents of these accounts) might initially expect. 
However, I don’t think this is a mysterious result— if a view has almost universally been associ-
ated with ‘silliness’ and incoherence then it shouldn’t be surprising to discover that philosophers 
have been reticent to embrace that label, however unfair the charges of silliness and incoherence 
are.
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and so avoid epistemic relativism.10 However, I don’t think the option is open to 
standpoint theorists to interpret the epistemic advantage thesis in this way.
The central and defining component of standpoint theory, the standpoint thesis, 
says that justification is dependent on socially-situated perspectives. This means 
that the justification of a ranking of different systems will be dependent on socially- 
situated perspectives too, and so standpoint theorists are committed to understand-
ing the epistemic advantage thesis (which is effectively a ranking of different 
systems) as system-dependent. The epistemic advantage has to be understood as 
system-dependent if standpoint theorists are going to maintain a consistent view, 
and so standpoint theory is best understood as a form of epistemic relativism.11
5.4  Relativism in Perspectival Realism
In the last sect. I recounted my argument that standpoint theory is a kind of relativ-
ism. I argued that, in addition to having the first two components of relativism—
dependence and plurality—standpoint theory can also be shown to have the more 
controversial, third component of relativism, namely non-neutral symmetry. 
Standpoint theorists can’t appeal to an absolutist ranking of standpoints (because of 
their commitment to dependence) and they (correctly) deny that their view involves 
symmetry based on equal validity, so the epistemic advantage thesis is best under-
stood in line with non-neutral symmetry. We’ve already seen that there are signifi-
cant structural similarities between perspectival realism and standpoint theory, 
which may suggest that perspectival realism too could contain all three of these 
components. In this sect. I’ll follow through on this, by arguing that Giere’s per-
spectival realism is committed to all three components, and so is a kind of epistemic 
relativism.
Let’s start with the first component. Dependence says that a belief has an epis-
temic status (as justified or not) only relative to an epistemic system or practice. 
Giere’s perspectivism, like standpoint theory, says that knowledge is situated: scien-
tific claims can only be made using, and evaluated against, scientific models and 
their associated instruments, methods and interpretive conventions. This means that, 
10 Aidan McGlynn raised a similar point in a commentary on an earlier version of this paper: at least 
some arguments for standpoint theory (those turning on examples of scientific progress made by 
the introduction of a feminist perspective) seem to justify an absolutist understanding of epistemic 
advantage. In addition to the response I go on to make above (that this would render standpoint 
theory inconsistent) I also dispute that McGlynn’s is the best way to understand these examples. I 
believe they can be explained just as well by deploying a relativist understanding of shared prog-
ress, which doesn’t justify an absolutist understanding of advantage, as they can with an absolute 
notion of progress. I defend this claim in Ashton (forthcoming).
11 To be clear, I don’t consider this to be a problematic result for standpoint theorists because, as 
I’ve argued elsewhere (Ashton forthcoming; Ashton and McKenna forthcoming), the most fre-
quently criticised aspects of relativist feminist epistemologies are much less troubling than they are 
typically supposed to be.
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according to perspectival realism, any scientific knowledge claim we might make is 
necessarily understood and evaluated relative to an epistemic (scientific) practice, 
and so its epistemic status is dependent on that practice. Perspectival realism incor-
porates the dependence component.12
The second component is plurality, which says that there are, have been, or could 
be multiple epistemic systems or practices. This, too, is the case according to per-
spectival realism, whose proponents point to various different models and practices, 
such as Aristotelian and Ptolemaic perspectives (models and practices), Copernican 
and Newtonian ones, and the contemporary perspective of General Relativity (Giere 
2006, 94). Of course, these different perspectives share plenty of very general prin-
ciples, such as principles outlining the most general uses of observation and testi-
mony, but there are other, narrower, principles which are specific to particular 
perspectives. For example, principles of the form:
“If S uses instrument i, and observes result r, whilst conditions c obtain, then S is justified 
in believing x.”
These are the kinds of principles which scientists from different perspectives dis-
agree over, and which (in combination with more general principles, as well as 
certain modelling practices) their different beliefs are justified relative to. So the 
plurality component is also present in perspectival realism.
The final component is symmetry, and specifically non-neutral symmetry, which 
says that there is no neutral way to rank different epistemic practices. We can see 
this reflected in Giere’s view even more clearly than in feminist standpoint theory. 
Like standpoint theorists, Giere believes in scientific progress and doesn’t judge all 
perspectives to be on a par. This might be taken to undermine symmetry; where 
standpoint theorists draw on the epistemic advantage thesis, Giere can appeal to a 
Kuhnian picture of progress on which perspectives differ in their puzzle-solving 
power.13 But, also in common with standpoint theorists, Giere is committed to situ-
ated perspectival knowledge. This means that we should expect him to reject abso-
lutism and recognise that the scientific claims he makes, including claims he makes 
about the ranking of different perspectives, are perspectival too. And he does this; 
he explicitly rules out the possibility that perspectivism itself is absolutely justified 
and perspective-free, instead acknowledging that it is developed “within the frame-
work of contemporary science”, and that his “own claims must be reflexively under-
stood as themselves perspectival” (Giere 2006, 3).
12 To be clear, this needn’t be dependence in the sense of logical dependence. The knowledge 
claims in question don’t need to be shown to logically follow from a set of propositions or princi-
ples that make up the relevant perspective. All that’s required is that knowledge claims’ epistemic 
statuses are dependent on a scientific system or practice.
13 On (at least one reading of) Thomas Kuhn’s (1994: 160–73) view, successive scientific para-
digms solve more, or more important, puzzles (i.e., they are able to explain more, or more impor-
tant, disparities between what the paradigm’s theories predict and what its experiments appear to 
show) than their predecessors. Thanks to Michela Massimi for pointing out that this option is 
available to Giere.
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This is precisely the move that I encouraged standpoint theorists to make in the 
previous section: to take situatedness (or perspectivality) seriously enough to apply 
it to one’s own claims, and to recognise that those claims are situated too. In making 
this move, Giere accepts non-neutrality. He accepts that there’s no neutral way to 
rank different perspectives, because any such ranking would itself be situated, and 
dependent on a scientific perspective. Like feminist standpoint theory, Giere’s per-
spectival realism incorporates dependence, plurality, and non-neutral symmetry, 
and so is a form of epistemic relativism. However, unlike standpoint theory, per-
spectival realism’s commitment to non-neutrality (at least in the work of Giere) is 
made much more explicit.
5.5  Non-Neutral and Non-silly Epistemic Relativism
I’ve just argued that perspectival realism, like standpoint theory, is a form of relativ-
ism. Relativism has a negative reputation and describing a view as relativist is typi-
cally seen (and often also intended) as being critical of that view. This is not my 
intention however. I think the form of relativism found in perspectival realism is 
unproblematic. In this section I will specify exactly what sort of relativism is pres-
ent in perspectival realism, making reference to Massimi’s account which builds on 
Giere’s work, and—perhaps more importantly—I’ll show what kind of relativism is 
not present in perspectival realism. The relativism present in perspectival realism is 
one that perspectival realists should embrace. The first specification I want to make 
is that perspectival realism is a form of epistemic, not metaphysical, relativism. 
Taking a closer look at Giere’s taxonomy of different views will help to make this 
point more clearly.
Giere frames his perspectival realism as an alternative to existing views: scien-
tific realism, and social constructivism. It will help to separate what each of these 
views have to say about metaphysics (how the world is) and epistemology (what we 
can legitimately say about the world).14 Giere seems to categorise scientific objec-
tivism as metaphysically realist (i.e., there is a single way the world is) and epis-
temically objectivist (i.e., there is a single correct description of that world that 
science strives to obtain, see 2006, 4–5). Massimi’s perspectival realism takes the 
first (metaphysical) component whilst rejecting the second (epistemic) one. Giere 
then explains that social constructivism is metaphysically anti-realist (i.e., it denies 
there’s a single way the world is),15 and epistemically perspectival (i.e., it says there 
are multiple legitimate ways of describing and understanding the word).16 Massimi’s 
14 This taxonomy almost certainly oversimplifies matters, but it will help to get a rough idea of the 
logical space.
15 Giere (2006, 7) cites the strongest version of social constructivism, according to which we con-
struct the world by constructing different sets of facts Latour and Woolgar (1979).
16 Here Giere (2006, 7–8) cites less radical versions of social constructivism: Bloor (1976); Collins 
(1981); and Shapin (1975, 1979).
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perspectival realism takes the latter (epistemic) component of this and rejects the 
former (metaphysical) one. The table below summarises this.
Scientific Realism Perspectival Realism Social Constructivism
Metaphysics Realist Realist Anti-realist
Epistemology Objectivist Perspectivist Perspectivist
So, on this understanding, perspectival realism combines the metaphysical view 
that there is a single way the world is with the epistemic view that there are multiple, 
legitimate ways that we can view or conceptualise the world. Its perspectivism is 
only present in the epistemic domain, making it an epistemic relativism. This means 
that perspectival realism avoids any worries associated with metaphysical or alethic 
relativism. I take this to be Massimi’s (2017) point when she considers the compat-
ibility of perspectivism and realism. She emphasises the distinction between meta-
physical and epistemic relativism, saying that the problem in the past has been 
people conflating the (epistemic/scientific) rejection of objectivity with relativism 
about truth (2017, 170). Even with this specification in place, worries about epis-
temic relativism might still remain. Giere considers two in particular, which I there-
fore need to address. Both of these turn out to be unproblematic because of the 
second specification that I will make: perspectival realism is a form of non-neutral 
relativism, rather than an equality-based relativism.
The first worry is that a relativist version of perspectival realism would run afoul 
of ‘the reflexive question’. Giere first mentions this question in connection with 
social constructivist theories. It asks whether or not views’ conclusions about con-
tingency apply to themselves. If they don’t, then holders of that view (in that case 
constructivism, in this case perspectival realism) grant their own conclusions excep-
tional objectivity—a surprising position, which requires further justification. And if 
they do, then holders of the view are forced to admit that their own conclusions are 
merely contingently (or relatively) justified (Giere 2006, 11).
Giere seems to consider this question to be problematic for social constructivists. 
He says that they have a “way out”, but cautions that it means aligning themselves 
with radical critics of science (2006, 11), whereas he claims that “no such prob-
lems” arise for the perspectival realist (Giere 2006, 95). However, my suggestion in 
the previous section, that perspectival realists embrace non-neutrality, might be 
thought to introduce these problems. It seems to commit perspectival realists to 
something like the second answer to the reflexive question, forcing them to admit 
that their own claims are ‘merely’ relatively justified.
Whilst I do think that perspectival realists are committed to the second response 
to the reflexive question—i.e., to saying that their conclusions themselves are per-
spectival, and so are contingently or relatively justified—I don’t think that this 
should be considered costly.
The apparent cost of relative justification is that it is ‘mere’, or a somehow lesser 
form of, justification. But lesser than what? This worry presumes that there is some 
other, bigger, better form of justification which relative justification falls short of. 
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This is an absolutist view. On any relativist view (including perspectival realism)
which denies both the existence and possibility of absolute justification, contingent, 
relative, perspectival justification is the best and most legitimate form of justifica-
tion available. So if perspectival realists acknowledge and accept the relativism in 
their view, then they can endorse the second answer to the reflexive question with-
out undermining themselves, and without casting aspersions on science.
Massimi’s (2018) account shows us one possible way to flesh out this idea. She 
proposes that scientific perspectives play a “double role”, where they function both 
as a context of use, which fixes its own standards of performance adequacy, and as 
a context of assessment, from which other perspectives can be evaluated (according 
to how well they meet the standards of performance adequacy which they have set 
2018: 353–7). On this view, perspectives aren’t the sole measure of their own suc-
cess, because other perspectives functioning as a standard of assessment are impor-
tant too, and so worries about lesser or redundant forms of justification are avoided. 
But no absolute, or perspective-independent, evaluation is required either, and so 
both non-neutrality and reflexivity are present.17
The second worry is that epistemic relativism “can be pushed to the absurd 
extreme that every perspective is regarded as good as any other” (Giere 2006, 13). 
This view is sometimes summarised using the phrase ‘anything goes’ (because all 
options are equally epistemically permissible). Giere denies that this conclusion 
follows from his view, making a distinction between perspectivism and “silly rela-
tivism”. I agree with the letter of this claim, but perhaps not the spirit.18 Regardless, 
I will explain why the ‘anything goes’ conclusion doesn’t follow from non- neutrality 
in particular, and why relativism based on non-neutrality is therefore non-silly.
It’s easy to see why this worry arises. The ‘anything goes’ conclusion can be 
derived from equal validity, which we’ve seen is commonly (though mistakenly) 
associated with relativism. Equal validity says that there is no way to rank epistemic 
systems whatsoever, and so (from an absolute, independent non-perspective) they 
are all as good as each other. On this sort of view, any perspective is legitimate, and 
so: anything goes. But as equal validity is not a component of perspectival realism, 
this source of the worry is not a concern for us.
Perspectival realism is only committed to non-neutrality. Non-neutrality comes 
from the idea that all justification is dependent, or perspectival, and so views incor-
porating non-neutrality aren’t able to state absolutely that one perspective is better 
than another. This might seem like another reason to worry about the anything goes 
conclusion besides equal validity. However, it’s not. It is possible to say on non- 
17 Massimi denies that her account is relativist, framing it as an alternative to both relativism and 
scientific objectivism. Whilst I agree that her account (2018) is not a form of alethic relativism (as 
discussed above), I believe it is a version of (non-silly) epistemic relativism, i.e., it incorporates 
dependence, plurality, and non-neutrality. In conversation Massimi has suggested that her view 
avoids non-neutrality (and so relativism) because it is able to account for scientific progress, how-
ever I have argued (forthcoming) that scientific progress and non-neutrality are compatible.
18 It’s not clear to me whether Giere thinks that all relativism is silly, or whether he accepts (as I do) 
that perspectival realism is a form of non-silly relativism and was merely distinguishing this from 
a subset of relativist views which are silly.
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neutral relativism that some perspectives are better or worse relative to a particular 
perspective. In other words, it is possible to provide a non-neutral ranking of differ-
ent epistemic systems. As long as one is taking a particular perspective—and 
according to perspectival realists this is always the case—it is possible to rank and 
evaluate epistemic systems, and so it is not the case that ‘anything goes’.
I don’t expect the promise of this relativized ranking to be enough to satisfy 
everyone. I’ve found there to be a common and strong absolutist intuition that some 
views are just better (or worse) than others, in an unrestricted and unmitigated 
sense, and so if perspectival realism can’t account for this it might leave some peo-
ple disappointed. I am sympathetic to this intuition, but it is an absolutist intuition, 
incompatible with views like perspectival realism and standpoint theory which are 
based on the situatedness of knowledge. Perspectival realists cannot consistently 
allow scientists to say that practices other than their own are absolutely unjustified. 
What they can do is show that non-neutral, perspectival rankings satisfy the criteria 
for a useful and desirable philosophy of science. This is what Giere and Massimi 
already claim to do: they argue that perspectival realism reconciles a useful scien-
tific realism with a plausible understanding of knowledge from a human point of 
view. Acknowledging that the relativist label applies to this view clarifies, rather 
than undermines, this work.
5.6  Conclusion
I began this paper by pointing to some similarities between perspectival realism and 
feminist standpoint theory. I said that they both see knowledge as situated, and that 
they have each been framed as a middle way between scientific objectivism on the 
one hand, and anti-realist or relativist views on the other. I then argued for a further 
similarity. The standpoint thesis which is central to feminist standpoint theory com-
mits them to dependency, and ultimately to a kind of relativism, and the perspectiv-
ism in perspectival realism does the same for their view. I have now clarified that the 
version of relativism present in perspectival realism is unproblematic. It is an epis-
temic relativism, which avoids the complications of metaphysical versions of rela-
tivism, and a non-neutral, non-silly relativism, which avoids the ‘anything goes’ 
conclusion. In closing, I will suggest two places where perspectival realism and 
feminist standpoint theory can learn from each other.
First, I think that perspectival realism has an opportunity to learn from feminist 
standpoint theory by expanding the range of factors that constitute a perspective. I 
haven’t argued for this here, but feminist standpoint theorists have argued that deci-
sions about which instruments to use, which methods to deploy, and which interpre-
tative conventions to rely on aren’t just affected by factors that scientists are 
consciously aware of. They argue that they (and other aspects of the scientific pro-
cess) are also affected by social factors like race and gender, that scientists might 
not be consciously aware of. Feminist standpoint theorists have had a hard time 
convincing most ‘mainstream’ epistemologists that this is the case, I think largely 
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because philosophers who are committed to absolutism and objectivity are primed 
to see views which don’t have these commitments as attacks on science and its 
goals, rather than suggestions for how to achieve those goals more effectively. I 
suspect that perspectival realists won’t have this problem, as their project is accepted 
as part of ‘mainstream’ philosophy of science and will thus be more amenable to the 
kinds of arguments that standpoint theorists make.
Second, I think that perspectival realists have something to teach standpoint the-
orists, namely that to be consistent they need to embrace reflexive perspectivality 
(or situatedness). Giere readily accepts that his own claims are as situated as those 
that he is attempting to theorise about, but standpoint theorists have been reticent to 
do this. This is a problem, because if they don’t recognise that their own claims (in 
particular the epistemic advantage thesis) are situated too, then they are not fully 
internalising the situated knowledge thesis and are allowing a tension to creep into 
their view. Standpoint theorist’s reticence to do this has, as far as I can tell, has been 
motivated by the goal of avoiding epistemic relativism, in an attempt to be taken 
seriously by ‘mainstream’ philosophers of science. My hope is that seeing this move 
made by perspectival realists, who are more mainstream, will ease these concerns 
and help feminist standpoint theorists too to embrace (non-silly) epistemic 
relativism.
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